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Integrated Airline Organizational Frameworks 
INTEGRATED AIRLINE ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
AND CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
Triant Flouris 
It is only through well-designed and implemented Crew Resource Management being deeply rooted in an airline's 
organizational culture that an airline can achieve its highest possible standard of safety, by having the highest degree 
of operational efficiency. It is not Crew Resource Management training itself that contributes to well-trained crew 
members who implement Crew Resource Management principles in flight operations. Rather, it is a strong company 
organizational culture that contributes, ultimately, to the effectiveness of Crew Resource Management. 
INTRODUCTION 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is based on the 
"effective management of a pilot's available resources."' 
The aviation community has come to the consensus that 
Crew Resource Management is a valid concept as several 
early studies on different aspects of CRM have 
demonstrated that causal links can be established between 
Crew Resource Management and flight s a f q .  Precisely, 
the analysis of several accidents in which the flight crew 
did not apply at all or did not apply Crew Resource 
Management concepts correctly are cited as Crew Resource 
Management related accidents3. Crew Resource 
Management is elusive as a concept and practice because it 
is multidimensional and its content is shaped by particular 
' Krause, Shari. Aircraft Safety: Accidents, Investigations, 
Analyses, and Applications. New York, NY: M e w - H i l l ,  
Inc., 1996, 5. 
See. Caro, Paul "Flight Training and Simulationn in Human 
Factors in Aviation. Ed. Wiener, Earl and Davis Nagel. San 
Diego: Academic Press, 1988: 258-259; Chute, Rebecca and 
Earl Wiener. March 1995. "On a Collision Course?" Air Line 
Pilot: 20-25; Foushee, Clayton and Robert Helmreich "Group 
-
Interaction and Flight Crew Performance." Human Factors in 
Aviation. Ed. Wiener, Earl and Davis Nagel. San Diego: 
Academic Press, 1988: 189-227; Helrnreich, Robert "Does 
CRM Training Work?" Air Line Pilot. May 1991: 17-20; 
Negrette, Arthur. "Cockpit Communication Could Save Your 
Life." Rotor and Wing International. February 1987: 22-23; 
Viets, Jack. "Cockpit Resource Management and Airline 
Safety." San Francisco Chronicle. 15 January 1986: Aa9. 
Ibid. 
circumstances that arise in the air and on the ground. The 
aforementioned definition of Crew Resource Management 
as the effedive management of a pilot's available resources 
is in itselfproblematic. What do we mean by effective, what 
by management, what is available and what is a resource? 
The above questions are valid and effective4 and Crew 
Resource Management training programs depend on they 
ways airlines define the above concepts. 
This paper recognizes the elusiveness of Crew Resource 
Management as a concept and therefore the difficulty in 
teaching Crew Resource Management "effectively" in 
training programs. Therefore, this research proposes an 
alternative to maximizing the overall safety and operating 
efficiency benefits of Crew Resource Management training. 
Our approach borrows heavily fiom organizational 
behavior theory. The most salient criticism of Crew 
Resource Management programs is that, whilst they focus 
on a concept that has to do with enhancing communication 
and cooperation and as such maximizing the efficiency of 
available resources, as the definition tells us, they are 
heavily technical in nature. So, Crew Resource 
Management training programs are captive of a mistake, 
which has been made in training programs for many years, 
Effectiveness is defined as "utility maximization." We can 
argue in circles here if we get into a definitional debate because 
effective actually means the reduction of accidents. Given that 
establishing causation in accidents is a problematic task in 
itself, the definition of "effective" can be a major problem; so, 
this paper in its limited space will not address. 
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which they try to eliminate. That is, whilst Crew Resource 
Management training tries to create pilots with skills that 
go beyond technical skills, Crew Resource Management in 
itself is taught as a technical skill. 
In this paper, we assume that Crew Resource 
Management is a non-technical, multidimensional, and 
elusive concept. Based on this assumption, we argue that 
Crew Resource Management should not be taught as a 
technical skill, but rather in non-technical and holistic ways 
to aid airlines in their Crew Resource Management 
training. This paper argues that the answer to maximizing 
the understanding and implementation of Crew Resource 
Management concepts in flight operations is the grounding 
of Crew Resource Management principles in a company's 
organizational culture. The just mentioned core argument 
of this paper suggests that, it is not Crew Resource 
Management training itselfthat contributes to well-trained 
crew members who implement Crew Resource 
Management principles in flight operations. Rather, it is a 
strong company organizational culture that contributes, 
ultimately, to the effectiveness of Crew Resource 
Management. 
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: 
DEFINITION AND EVOLUTION 
The concept of Crew Resource Management has proven 
so successful that many of the world's airlines have 
developed at least some form of Crew Resource 
Management training. The core of the program is to create 
teamwork and alleviate pilot error. Various techniques are 
designed to enhance management and leadership methods, 
emphasize decision-making and judgement skills, improve 
effective communication with others, and provide an 
overall productive work environment. The training also 
develops a keen insight into a person's behavior pattern 
during normal and emergency situations. 
As early as 1976, NASA researchers studied the value of 
total crew involvement and teamwork. One simulated 
exercise involved 18 experienced Boeing 747 pilots. The 
test included a progressive emergency coupled with bad 
weather and numerous cockpit distractions. Several flight 
engineers abandoned their critical fuel-burn calculations to 
oblige flight attendants who had interrupted them with 
trivial matters. As a result, 'WASA noted a number ofgrms 
operational errors, including one miscalculation of 100,000 
pounds of h e r 5 .  "Although some captains resumed a 
leadership role and regained the flight crew's attention, 
others either never heard what the flight attendant asked for 
or did nothing to stop the second officer from discontinuing 
his duties'%. 
Although most of the professional flying community has 
accepted Crew Resource Management training as a viable 
asset to one's leadership style, the United States National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) continues to 
document cases in which the cockpit is more like a 
demilitarized zone than a positive work environment. 
Usually being the more experienced airline pilot, the 
captain is most likely to dictate h e  objectives and priorities 
of the flight. Therefore, an underlying tone might be 
created that does not allow other crew members to speak 
fieely or worse, to do their jobs. In those cases, Crew 
Resource Management training might be the only way crew 
members could form a bridge between conflicting 
viewpoints or personalities and achieve the mutual goal of 
ending the day without incident. This is the reason why it 
is imperative to hire pilots with personalities pre-disposed 
to substantively accept Crew Resource Management 
principles.' 
It is important to note that a breakdown in Crew Resource 
Managment can cause problems other than fatal accidents. 
These may include operational inefficiencies and errors 
such as fuel miscalculations, clearance misunderstandings, 
ATC instruction misunderstandings, poor crew 
coordination etc, but could also include incidents and non- 
htal accidents. An example of such an incident is TWA 
843 on 30 July 1992, a LlOl 1, which caught fire after take- 
off at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York8. 
Krause, Shari. A i r 4  Safety Accidents. Investigations, 
Analyses. and Amlications. New York, NY: McCraw-Hill, 
Inc., 1996,6. Also see, Foushee, Clayton and Robert Helmreich 
"Group Interaction and Flight Crew Performance." Human 
Factors in Aviation. Ed Wiener, Earl and Davis Nagel. San 
Diego: Academic Press, 1988: 189-227. 
Krause 1996, 6. Krause, Shari. Aircraft Safety Accidents, 
Investigations, Analyses, and hplications. New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996. 
' This point will be addressed and further explained later in the 
paper, when suggestions for a more effective implementation of 
crew resource management training are discussed. 
National Transportation Safety Board. Aircraft Accident 
Report: Aborted Takeoff Shortlv After Liftoff, TWA 843 30 
July 1992. Lockheed L1011. N11002, JFK International 
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The take off roll was uneventll until the captain called 
VR The airplane had just lifted off when the first officer 
said, "Getting' a stall. You (the captain) got it." The 
captain replied, "Okay," and took the controls. Immediately 
thereafter, the first officer said, "Abort, get it on," quickly 
followed by the second officer's comment, "Get it off." The 
first officer and second officer then repeated their earlier 
comment. In the confusion, the captain asked, What was 
the matter? To which the first officer replied, "Getting a 
stall." As the captain turned the airplane off the runway to 
avoid hitting the blast fence, the first officer replied, 'Stay 
with it. Stay on the breaks, stay on the brakes." The 
airplane stopped in an open grass covered areag. "The 
NTSB cited "he inadequate crew coordination between the 
captain and first officer that resulted in their inappropriate 
response to a hlse stall warning" as the probable cause of 
the incident,I0 which produced no fatalities but caused an 
evacuation of the aircraft. 
United Airlines, with the assistance of NASA's human 
hctors division, pioneered one of the most respected Crew 
Resource Management programs in the world. A 
specialized team of psychologists, researchers, and pilots 
determined that effective Crew Resource Management 
training must incorporate three distinctive phases: 
awareness, practice and feedback, and continued 
reinforcement. Each phase is composed of several key 
elements, which when applied collectively, have been 
known to enhance the crew's overall work performance. 
According to documented statistics, since United began the 
Crew Resource Management training program, the airline's 
accident rate went fiom one hull loss per one million 
operations to one hull loss per 4.8 million operations". The 
average for all United States carriers is still one hull loss 
per one million operations. Nevertheless, the progress of 
these managerial concepts and techniques can be measured 
only during the aftermath of an incident or accident. 
Crew Resource Management training has changed 
dramatically since its inception. The original focus was on 




" Krause. Shari. Aircraft Safety: Accidents, Investieations, 
Analyses. and Applications. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 
Inc.. 1996. 
the cockpit crew. As programs matured and evolved, their 
focus broadened to include cabin crews and other elements 
of the system in which crews' function. Crew Resource 
Management programs also became more operational in 
focus and began to concentrate on specific behaviors that 
enhance team functioning. Many of the later courses also 
began to address system issues and the influence of culture 
on team interaction. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
Definitions of organizational culture vary, according to 
the academic discipline fiom which they originated. 
Business schools have the tendencyto define organizational 
culture as phenomenon that can be managed. Sociologists 
and Anthropologists stress the uniqueness of individual 
organizations. This uniqueness is a historically derived 
subjective phenomenon that goes beyond simple 
management. Organizational psychologists with an 
empirical background believe that organizational culture 
can be broken down in its component parts and then 
studied part by part. 
We define organizational culture as the values, beliefs, 
assumptions, rituals, symbols, and behavior that define an 
organized group, especially in relationship to other 
organized groups. The visl'ble part of organizational culture 
consists of observable behaviors and recognizable 
manifestations such as members' uniforms, symbols and 
logos, organizational routines and rituals, and printed 
documents. The deep layer of culture consists of the values, 
beliefs, and the subconscious assumptions that provide the 
logic, which guides the members' behaviors. 
The important aspect of organizational culture vis-a-vis 
Crew Resource Management effectiveness is theunderlying 
culture or deep culture. The visible part of culture is only 
procedural and is based on an organizational symbology. 
An employee dissatisfied with his organization who is not 
performing his duties to high standards will still wear the 
company uniform to work. Therefore, in this scenario, the 
values, beliefi, and subconscious assumptions of the 
employee, vis-a-vis his organization are sub-optimal and 
yet, his appearance will appear normal. 
The cultural strength of an organization has been defined 
by researchers in organizational management, sociology, 
and anthropology, in a variety of ways. It has been defined 
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as coherence", homogeneityi3, stability and intensity14, 
congmencel5, and internalized controlI6. Cultural strength 
relates to whom and how many accept the dominant values, 
how strongly these values are held, and how long the values 
have been dominant1'. The underlying concept to cultural 
strength is the way in which employees accept these values. 
That is, employees must substantively believe in their 
organizational culture. 
To substantively believe in one's company's 
organizational culture an employee must be convinced of 
the superiority of that culture and that culture must 
conform to his personality and national culture. This 
discussion is further complicated for organizations that 
exist in multicultural states1' and companies that rely on 
expatriate personnel, thereby bringing a multitude ofpeople 
for diametrically different cultures, ethnicities, and nations 
under one organizational rubric. Does cultural strength 
actually have an impact on organizational performance? 
Using an operationalization of cultural strengthIg, two 
longitudinal studies have shown that a strong culture is 
predictive of organizational performance as measured by 
l2 Deal, T. and A. Kennedy. Corporate Cultures: The Rites 
and Rituals of Cowrate Life. Reading, MA. Addison-Wesley, 
1982. 
l3  Ouchi, W. and R. Price. 'Hierarchies, clans and theory 2: A 
new perspective on organizational development,' 
Organizational Dynamics, 7,25-44. 1978. 
l4 Schein, E. Ormirational Culture and Leadership. 2* edn. 
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992. 
l5 Schall, M. 'A communication-rules approach to 
organizational culture', Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 28, 557-81. 1983. 
l6 DiTomaso, N. 'Symbolic media and social solidarity: The 
foundations of corporate cultures', Research in the Sociolow of 
Oraanizations, 5, 105-34. 1987. 
Gordon, G,  and N. DiTomaso, "Predicting corporate 
performance 6om organizational culture," Journal of 
Manaeement Studies 29 (1992): 783-98. 
Is  That is really not a major problem because in culturally 
diverse states we still see the relevance of a national culture, 
which goes beyond cultural or ethnic diversity and unifies 
people under one national h e w o r k .  The United States is a 
good example of such a case. 
19 Cultural strength was measured based on the consistency 
rather than the content of employee responses to survey items 
about organizational culture. 
short-term profits and growth in ass@. 
It is obvious that we cannot make similar claims about 
the relationship between cultural strength, organizational 
behavior, adherence to Crew Resource Management 
principles, and flight safety. However, ifthe assumptions of 
this paper are correct vis-a-vis the relationship of 
organization behavior based on organizational culture and 
safety based on effective Crew Resource Management then, 
a careful study linking organizational behavior and safety 
will demonstrate the validity of our assumption. A research 
project as such will be valid and provide airlines with the 
evidence and procedures they will need to implement 
organizational behavior changes to aid their respective 
organizational cultures for the ultimate goal of safety. 
CONCLUSION 
There are several issues that airlines need to address in 
order to enhance their Crew Resource Management 
training by basing it on a strong organizational culture 
basis and thus, contribute to their overall safety and 
operational efficiency records. As a first step, clear 
organizational standards2' and policies need to be set. 
These standards need to be clear enough so that they 
explicate the airline's goals and procedures. Company 
publications and other documents provide an opportunity to 
strengthen company culture by articulating the values and 
publishing the norms. Management needs to always send a 
"we" message in its intra company communications rather 
than a divisive "us and them" message. Multicultural and 
unicultural airlines alike should be explicit with their 
directives. Airlines should adopt a '% practices" 
approach to standards and procedures to allow all 
employees to focus on the important outcomes. 
Airlines should also use systems and procedures, flight 
and ground training-as they do already-toward the 
achievement of effective Crew Resource Management and 
ultimately safety. Technical skills training should remain 
true to its core focal point, which are technical skills. The 
* Denison, D. R Cormrate Culture and Organizational 
Effktiveness. New York, NY: Wiley Publishers, 1990. Gordon, 
G. and N. DiTomaso, "Predicting corporate performance from 
organizational culture," Journal of Management Studies 29 
(1992): 783-98. 
Such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) on crew 
behavior, flight safety, intercultural sensitivity etc. that help 
achieve organizational standards, that is, company values and 
norms. 
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major mistake some airlines make is to assume that Crew 
Resource Management can be taught as a technical skill. 
Certain aspects of Crew Resource Management are helped 
by technical skillsz bUf Crew Resource Management itself 
is a non-technical skill; rather it is a behavioral pattern, 
which can be enhanced through training in certain 
technical skills, which are part of it. In other words, Crew 
Resource Management is an attitude and crew members 
must be predisposed to accept this attitude and, through 
training and contemplation, help it flourish. We should not 
forget that, a good CRM pilot is one who knows how to fly 
his plane. CRM skills, in the absence ofproficient technical 
skills are worthless. Though, proficient technical skills in 
the absence of CRM skills are one sided and dangerous. 
This study advocates that CRM is not a technical skill and 
should not be taught as a technical skill but at the same 
time it is imperative that it works in synergy with technical 
skills to achieve the overarching goals of safety and 
operational efficiency. 
A major complication here is the reliance of many 
airlines on the military in terms of their pilot recruitment. 
Military pilots are groomed to be more self-reliant than 
civilian pilotst3. They are also more used to a more 
regimented order of Standard Operating Rocedures than a 
civilian pilot, an order that includes taking orders without 
questioning authority and giving orders expecting their 
authority not to be challenged. The above mentioned 
''military" attributes, though exaggerated and simplified, 
are not compatible with Crew Resource Management goals 
which include effective use of all available resources which 
is based on effective communication and cooperation. 
Airlines need to make sure not only that they hire 
22 For example the use of specific codified language to describe 
certain situations and crew actions in an effort to minimize 
miscommunication based on linguistic misunderstanding. 
" Especially those who served as fighter jet pilots and had to 
rely primarily on their own judgement to make all operating 
decisions that had to do with their aircraft. Coordination and 
communication with other pilots did not exist on operational 
issues in the same cockpit, even though many single pilot 
military operations do require effective communication skills. 
This is the primary reason why the military is placing more and 
more emphasis on Crew Resource Management Training. It the 
strong "individualism" attributes eclipse in one pilot military 
operations then, military pilots in the h u e  will be more 
suitable to accept Crew Resource Management responsibilities 
in commercial operations. 
technically well qualified crew members but crew members 
with an open mind to accept Crew Resource Management 
principles and maximize their use in flight operations in a 
substantive and not a procedural way. In other words, new 
employees should be selected for their potential to be inter 
culturally sensitive, in addition to their technical 
competence. 
How can an airline train crew members in the technical 
aspects of Crew Resource Management once it has 
recruited those pilots that it has identified as suitable to 
accept the principles of Crew Resource Management in 
their substance? Simulator training and classroom 
training are both very effective ways if they are designed 
and conducted properly and by qualified instructors. 
Simulator training in particular can become a very effective 
and safe way to rehearse the company's standards and 
procedures. The inclusion of Air Traffic Controllers and 
non-cockpit personnel in Crew Resource Management 
training classrooms and simulators is very important and 
has been part of Crew Resource Management training 
programs for many airlines recently. It is important because 
through flight and non-flight crew interaction we can 
ensure mutual understanding when it comes to each 
group's roles and responsibilities in flight operations. We 
can also ensure that through interaction and mutual 
understanding the above mentioned groups could 
coordinate their actions effectivelyto deal with emergencies 
or to improve the overall efficiency of flight operations. 
A very important question to be addressed here is how does 
an airline know which individuals are more suitable to be good 
Crew Resource Management candidates. The best method 
would be to subject them to more multi dimensional personality 
tests than the ones currently administered to gauge their 
potential for working effectively in-groups. Research has 
identified certain artributes as good predictors of 
communicative success; these include patience, maturity, 
stability, selfanfidence, perseverance, problem solving, 
tolerance, professional annmitment, and initiative. The 
problem here is how these above-mentioned qualities can be 
measured effectively given there are personality traits and as 
such hard to quantif4. Personality traits are very important and 
should be stressed early on in pilot training. Student pilots 
should be trained on the technical aspects of training but also 
on the effective management of resources in flight operation, 
fiom the first day of their training. That would be necessary in 
terms of helping student pilots develop those personality 
characteristics, which will help them become effective 
professional pilots, early on in their careers. 
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There is another form of non-technical training, which 
could also be considered, particularly by airlines with 
multi-cultural crews. Intacultural awareness and sensitivity 
training could be provided to expatriates, their families and 
host nationalsz. This training will facilitate quicker 
adaptation to the new environment and stronger 
cooperation amongst employees. It is equally important, if 
not more important, to make sure that existing employees 
are not offended by new and alien practices and have a 
general attitude, which facilitates understanding of other 
people, especially when these people are different than 
them26. It is not only the old adage "when in Rome do as 
the Romans do" which is important here. As 'Romans" we 
must accept that visitors may be different than we are and 
not well versed in our ways, so, we should exhibit an 
attitude of understanding other people's ways that do not 
conform to our accepted norms. As such we should be 
willing to give the 'knefit of the doubt'' to these people, at 
least in the short run, and help them adjust in their new 
realities. 
The best-designed Crew Resource Management training 
programs can only achieve their potential impact if they are 
harmonized with an airline's national, professional, and 
organizational cultures. Figure One provides a graphical 
depiction (as a funnel) of the link between the existence of 
a strong and integrated organizational fiamework (the bond 
in the funnel), several employee groups (circles in the 
funnel) that are a part of that fiamework, Crew Resource 
Management training in which these groups participate (as 
well as Air Traffic Control), and operational safety. 
Language training may also be important and serve as a 
facilitator to intercultural awareness, for, one cannot 
understand another culture if helshe does not understand the 
primary medium of verbal communication in that culture, 
which is its language. Native English speakers should also be 
trained on how to communicate simply and precisely with non- 
Anglo persomel when needed and to avoid, at any cost, the use 
of linguistic idioms in their communication. All pilots and other 
personnel should strive for the least ambiguous communication 
possible in the cockpit, between cockpit and non~ockpit crew, 
and between cockpit and Air Traffic Control. 
26 Airlines need to be careful though in this situation not to 
treat expatriate pilots "too" nice, as this would run the danger 
of creating a dual-class system structure of pilots within the 
company, which in turn could cause significant internal 
resentment within its pilot ranks. Iflocal pilots think they are 
treated not as nicely as expatriate pilots then, serious blows to 
group cohesion and company organizational culture will ensue. 
Implementation of effective Crew Resource Management 
training, which is shaped by and in turn can shape an 
airline's organizational culture, depends on many very 
significant variables. 
The history of the airline is very important in 
determining the shape and magnitude of its training 
programs. An old established carrier would have different 
demands than a new carrier. Whether an airline has been 
subject to a cohesive historical background rather than the 
product of mergers is also very important. Airlines that 
have come to exist as products of mergers have normally a 
harder time with the cohesion and implementation of 
procedures as, in a certain case, the airlines that merged 
may have had many managerial and other 
incompatibilities. 
The size of an airline is also an important discriminating 
factor in the implementation of Crew Resource 
Management training programs. Small carriers have 
different needs than large carriers, which in many cases 
could outsource training instead of providing it in-house. 
The country of origin of an airline is also important due to 
regulatory fiameworks and governmental involvement in 
the industry or even airline. Flag carriers owned and 
operated by governments often have structures that 
resemble civil service structures. Training must comply and 
be compatible with these realities and cater to the existing 
type and strength of the airline's organizational culture. 
The point that there are not universally valid truths in 
Crew Resource Management training needs to be stressed. 
Something that works in Spain might not work in 
Singapore and vice-versa. Training programs must be 
culturally sensitive in addition to being tied to an 
organizational culture. This "cultural relativity" argument 
does not mean though that any Crew Resource 
Management program, as long as it is culturally sensitive, 
is a good program. Culturally sensitive programs with poor 
content are as ineffective as programs with good content 
that are culturally insensitive. The argument here is that 
training programs must be delivered differently to different 
constituencies and be structurally adapted to fit specific 
organizational cultures. 
It is only through well-designed and implemented Crew 
Resource Management being deeply rooted in an airline's 
organizational culture that an airline can achieve its 
highest possible standard of safety, by having the highest 
degree of operational efficiency. Airlines need to start 
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treating their employees as important members of a group mutual understanding and sensitivity, should start before 
with a common organizational identity. Properly trained the employee is hired and continue until the employee 
and informed employees who are well treated-along with retires.0 
their families-by their airline have the potential to be 
happier and thus more productive. Establishing a fiunily 
type relationship with employees, a relationship based on 
Triant Houris holds a Ph.D. in International Economics fiom the University of- Carolina (1995). He is a commercial pilot 
and flight instructor with over 3000 total flight time. He joined the Aviation program at Auburn University in March 1998 a%= 
having worked for Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand as a fellow for one year and Portland State University as 
an Assistant Professor for two years. His research includes European Union Economic and Industrial Policy, Production and 
Operations Management in Aerospace Manuhcturing, Airline Operations Management, and more recently CRM. He has 
published a book (Communication in International Economic Negotiations) and several refereed and academic journal articles. 
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Integrated Airline Organizational Frameworks 
FIGURE 1 
Organizational Culture, CRM, and Safe@' 
" MGM stands for Management; FA stands for Flight Attendants; PL stands for Pilots; MA stands for Maintenance; GR stands 
for Ground Services; ATC stands for air Traffic Control. 
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